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ABSTRACT
Trustless systems, such as those blockchain enpowered, provide trust in the system regardless of the
trust of its participants, who may be honest or malicious. Proof-of-stake (PoS) protocols and DAG-
based approaches have emerged as a better alternative than the proof of work (PoW) for consensus.
This paper introduces a new model, so-called StakeDag, which aims for PoS consensus in a DAG-
based trustless system. We address a general model of trustless system in which participants are
distinguished by their stake or trust: users and validators. Users are normal participants with a no
assumed trust and validators are high profile participants with an established trust.
We then propose a new family of stake-based consensus protocolsS, operating on the DAG as in the
Lachesis protocol [1]. Specifically, we propose a stake-based protocol Sφ that leverages participants’
stake as validating weights to achieve more secure distributed systems with practical Byzantine fault
tolerance (pBFT) in leaderless asynchronous Directed Acyclic Graph (DAG). We then present a
general model of staking for asynchronous DAG-based distributed systems.
Keywords Proof of Stake · DAG · Consensus algorithm · StakeDag protocol · Byzantine fault tolerance · Trustless
System · Validating power · Staking model · S-OPERA chain · Layering · Lamport timestamp · Main chain · Root ·
Clotho · Atropos · Distributed Ledger
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1 Introduction
Trustless systems provide trust in the system regardless of the trust of its participants. In trustless systems, the par-
ticipants’ trusts are not assumed, but rather they may be honest or malicious. After the success over cryptocurrency,
blockchains have emerged as a technology platform for secure decentralized transaction ledgers. They have been
applied in numerous domains including financial, logistics as well as health care sectors. Blockchains provide im-
mutability and transparency of blocks and are emerging as a promising solution for building trustless systems including
distributed ledgers.
The concept of Byzantine fault tolerance (BFT) [2] guaratees the reliability of a distributed database system when
one-third of the participants may be compromised. Consensus algorithms [3] ensure the integrity of transactions over
the distributed network [2] and is equivalent to the proof of BFT in distributed database systems [4, 5]. Determin-
istic, completely asynchronous system does not guarantee Byzantine consensus with unbounded delays [6], but it is
completely feasible for nondeterministic system. All nodes in practical Byzantine fault tolerance (pBFT) can reach a
consensus for a block in the presence of a Byzantine node [7]. Consensus in pBFT is reached once a created block is
shared with other participants and the share information is further shared with others [8, 9].
Bitcoin and blockchain technologies have shown a phenomenal success that has enabled numerous opportunities for
business and innovation. These protocols facilitate highly trustworthy, append-only, transparent public distributed
ledgers. The underlying technologies have brought a huge promise to shape up the future of financial transactions,
and potentially to redefine how people and companies compute, work and collaborate. Despite of the great success,
the current blockchain-based systems are still facing some challenges, which attracted a lot of research in consensus
algorithms [10, 11, 12].
Proof of Work (PoW) [10] is the most used model since introduced in the original Nakamoto consensus protocol in
Bitcoin. Under PoW, validators are randomly selected based on the computation power they use. This process costs
electricity that prevents attackers to change transaction records. PoW protocol requires exhausive computational work
from participants for block generation, and also needs quite a long time for transaction confirmation. Since then, there
have been an extensive amount of work to address these limitations.
Recent technological and innovative advances have led to new consensus algorithms [11, 13, 12, 14, 15, 16] to improve
the consensus confirmation time and power consumption over blockchain-powered distributed ledgers.
Proof Of Stake (PoS) [11, 13] uses participants’ stakes for generating blocks. Stake is an amount of the cryptocurrency
that a participant possesses and can prove it. Under PoS, the network achieves distributed consensus on a blockchain
by randomly selecting the creator of the next block with a probability based on their stake. In PoS, validators vote on
the authentic transactions based on their stake, an amount of tokens that they deposit into an account, which is frozen
for a certain period of time. PoS brings environmental advantage with much less power consumption than PoW. If a
participant is dishonest and compromised, its stake is voided and burnt. The penalty of losing its stake has proved an
effective prevention of attack, since the stake loss will outweight the potential gain of an attack for any attacker. Thus,
PoS is safer than proof-of-work (PoW), especially due to the scarcity of stakes in PoS compared to the easy-to-get
computing power required in PoW.
The concept of a DAG (directed acyclic graph) cryptocurrency was first introduced in 2015 in DagCoin paper [12].
DAG technology becomes a promising alternative that allows cryptocurrencies to function similarly to those that utilize
blockchain technology without the need for blocks and miners. DAG-based approaches have recently emerged as a
promising alternative than the proof of work (PoW) for consensus. These approaches utilize directed acyclic graphs
(DAG) [12, 15, 16, 17, 18] to facilitate consensus. Examples of DAG-based consensus algorithms include Tangle [19],
Byteball [20], and Hashgraph [21].
1.1 Motivation
Lachesis protocol [1] presents a general model of DAG-based consensus protocols. The Lachesis consensus protocols
create a directed acyclic graph for distributed systems. We introduced a Lachesis consensus protocols[1, 22], which
are DAG-based asynchronous non-deterministic to achieve pBFT. The protocols generate each block asynchronously
and uses the OPERA chain (DAG) for faster consensus by confirming how many nodes share the blocks. Recently,
we introduced an ONLAY framework [23] that achieves scalable, reliable consensus in a leaderless aBFT DAG. This
framework uses the concepts of graph layering and hierarchical graphs on the DAGs. Then assigned layers are used to
achieve deterministic topological ordering of finalized event blocks in an asynchronous leaderless DAG-based system.
There is only a few research work studying Proof-of-Stake in DAG-based consensus protocols; one example is [21].
Hence, we are interested in investigating to use participants’ stakes to improve DAG-based consensus protocol. We aim
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to see whether such a Proof of Stake model, which associates each participant with their stake or trust can guarantee a
more reliable and robust consensus in trustless systems.
1.2 StakeDag Protocols
In this paper, we propose a new family S of consensus protocols, denoted by the StakeDag protocols, that aims for
PoS based consensus in a DAG-based trustless system. We introduce a general model of trustless system in which
participants are distinguished by their stake or trust: users and validators. Users are participants with a default low
score of trust and validators are high profile with a high trust score.
A synchronous approach in BFT systems broadcasts the voting and asks each node for a vote on the validity of
each block. Instead, our StakeDag protocol aims for an asynchronous leaderless system. StakeDag protocol uses
the concept of distributed common knowledge together with network broadcasting to reach a consistent global view
with high probability from its local view. Each node batches client transactions into a new event block and stores in
its own DAG. The new event block is then shared with other nodes through asynchronous event transmission. Each
node shares its own blocks as well as the ones it received from other nodes. This asynchronous step will spread all
information through the network, and thus it can increase throughput near linearly as the number of nodes participating
the network.
Our general model of stake-based consensus protocols S, which is based on the Lachesis protocol [1]. In S proto-
col, each event block has one self-parent reference to the top event block of the same creator, and k-1 other-parent
references to the top blocks of other nodes. Specifically, S protocol leverages participants’ stake as validating power
to achieve practical Byzantine fault tolerance (pBFT) in leaderless asynchronous Directed Acyclic Graph (DAG). We
then present a general model of staking for asynchronous DAG-based distributed systems.
Figure 1: A General Framework of StakeDag Protocols
Figure 1 shows a general framework of our StakeDag protocols. Each node contains a DAG consisting of event blocks.
In each node, the information of accounts and their stakes are stored. The main steps in a PoS DAG-based consensus
protocol include (a) block creation, (b) updating flagtable, (c) selecting roots and updating the root sets, (d) assigning
frames, (e) selecting Clothos/Atropos, and (f) ordering the final blocks. For a StakeDag protocol, the major steps
are highlighted in blue. These steps are (1) updating flagtable; (2) computing validation score of a block, and (3)
assigning weights to new roots. Remarkably, the Check of whether a block is a root in StakeDag protocol is different
from that Check in Lachesis protocol: StakeDag protocol requires more than 2/3 of validating power (of total stake)
while Lachesis requires more than 2/3 of the total number of nodes.
Figure 2 depicts an example of an S-OPERA chain, which is a weighted acyclic directed graph stored as the local
view of each node. There are five nodes in the example, three of which are normal users with validating power of 1,
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(a) DAG with k = 2 (b) DAG with k = 3
Figure 2: Examples of DAG with users and validators
and the rest are validators whose validating power are set to 2. In this example, each event block has two references:
self-parent and other-parent references. The event blocks created by the validators are highlighted in red.
StakeDag protocol leverages asynchronous event transmission for practical Byzantine fault tolerance (pBFT). The
core idea of StakeDag is to create a leaderless, scalable, asynchronous DAG. By computing asynchronous partially
ordered sets with logical time ordering instead of blockchains, StakeDag offers a new practical alternative framework
for distributed ledgers.
The main concepts of StakeDag are given as follows:
− Event block An immutable set of transactions created by a node and is then transported to other nodes. Event
block includes signature, timestamp, transaction records and referencing hashes to previous (parent) blocks.
− S protocols a family of StakeDag protocols.
− S protocol a specific protocol of theS family, which sets the rules for event creation, communication and reaching
consensus in StakeDag.
− Stake This corresponds to the amount of tokens each node posesses in their deposit. This value decides the vali-
dating power a node can have.
− User node A user node has a small amount stake (e.g., containing 1 token).
− Validator node A validator node has large amount of stakes (≥ 2 tokens).
− Validation score Each event block has a validation score, which is the sum of the weights of the roots that are
reachable from the block.
− S-OPERA chain is the local view of the weighted Directed Acyclic Graph (DAG) held by each node. This local
view is used to determine consensus.
− Root An event block is called a root if either (1) it is the first event block of a node, or (2) it can reach more than
2/3 of the network’s validating power from other roots. A root set Rs contains all the roots of a frame. A
frame f is a natural number assigned to Root sets and its dependent event blocks.
− Root graph Root graph contains roots as vertices and reachability between roots as edges.
− Clotho A Clotho is a root at layer i that is known by a root of a higher frame (i + 1), and which in turns is known
by another root in a higher frame (i +2).
− Atropos An Atropos is a Clotho that is assigned with a consensus time.
−Main chain StakeDag’s Main chain is a list of Atropos blocks and the the subgraphs reachable from those Atropos
blocks.
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We then introduce a specific Sφ protocol of the S family. Sφ protocol uses the concept of layering, similar to its use
in our ONLAY protocol [23]. S protocol integrates online layering algorithms with stake-based validation to achieve
practical Byzantine fault tolerance (pBFT) in leaderless DAG. The protocol achieves reliable, scalable consensus
in asynchronous pBFT by using assigned layers and asynchronous partially ordered sets with logical time ordering
instead of blockchains. The partial ordering produced by Sφ is flexible but consistent across the distributed system of
nodes.
We then present a formal model for the Sφ protocol. The formalization can be applied to abstract asynchronous Proof
of Stake DAG-based distributed system. The formal model is built upon the model of current common knowledge
(CCK) [24].
1.3 StakeDag Staking Model
In this paper, we present a staking model, which can be applied to a general model of stake-based PoS consensus
protocols. In particular, our staking model can be integrated nicely with our StakeDag protocols.
We introduce the mechanics, mathematical reasoning and formulae for calculating various aspects of StakeDag system.
We then present our system design with multiple incentive mechanisms to achieve high throughput, scalability, security
and decentralisation.
1.4 Contributions
In summary, this paper makes the following contributions:
• We propose a new scalable framework, so-called StakeDag, aiming for practical more secure DAG-based
trustless systems.
• We present a family S of PoS DAG-based consensus protocols to achieve more reliable consensus in asyn-
chronous leaderless trustless systems.
• We present a staking model that can be applied to any PoS DAG-based protocols.
• We introduce a novel consensus protocol Sφ, which uses layer algorithm and root graphs, for faster root
selection. Sφ protocol uses layer assignment on the DAG to achieve quick consensus with a more reliable
ordering of final event blocks.
• A formal model and proof of BFT of our StakeDag protocol are defined using CCK model [24]. We formalize
our proofs into any generic aBFT Proof of Stake DAG system. StakeDag protocol achieves global consistent
view via layer assignment with probability one in pBFT condition.
1.5 Paper structure
The rest of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 gives the related work. Section 3 presents our general model
of Proof of Stake DAG-based consensus protocols. Section 4 introduces a staking model that is used for our StakeDag
consensus protocol. Section 5 describes a specific protocol, namely S protocol, that uses layering algorithms to
achieve a more reliable and scalable solution to the consensus problem in BFT systems. Section 6 discusses about
several important aspects of Proof of Stake DAG-based protocols, such as fairness and security. Section 7 concludes.
Further details about our StakeDag framework and the Sφ protocol are given in the Appendix. It covers details about
background plus Proof of Byzantine fault tolerance of the protocols.
2 Related work
2.1 An overview of Blockchains
A blockchain is a type of distributed ledger technology (DLT) to build record-keeping system in which its users possess
a copy of the ledger. The system stores transactions into blocks that are linked together. The blocks and the resulting
chain are immutable and therefore serving as a proof of existence of a transaction. In recent years, the blockchain
technologies have seen a widespread interest, with applications across many sectors such as finance, energy, public
services and sharing platforms.
For a public or permissionless blockchain, it has no central authority. Instead, consensus among users is paramount
to guarantee the security and the sustainability of the system. For private, permissioned or consortium blockchains,
6
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one entity or a group of entities can control who sees, writes and modifies the data on it. We are interested in the
decentralisation of BCT and hence only public blockchains are considered in this section.
In order to reach a global consensus on the blockchain, users must follow the rules set by the consensus protocol of
the system.
Proof of Work Bitcoin was the first and most used BCT application. Proof of Work (PoW) is the consensus protocol
introduced by the Bitcoin in 2008 [10]. In PoW protocol, it relies on user’s computational power to solve a crypto-
graphic puzzle that creates consensus and ensures the integrity of data stored in the chain. Nodes validate transactions
in blocks (i.e. verify if sender has sufficient funds and is not double-spending) and competes with each other to solve
the puzzle set by the protocol. The incentive for miners to join this mining process is two-fold: the first miner, who
finds a solution, is rewarded (block reward) and gains all the transaction fees associated to the transactions.
The key component in Bitcoin protocol and its successors is the PoW puzzle solving. The miner that finds it first
can issue the next block and her work is rewarded in cryptocurrency. PoW comes together with an enormous energy
demand.
From an abstract view, there are two properties of PoW blockchain:
• Randomized leader election: The puzzle contest winner is elected to be the leader and hence has the right to
issue the next block. The more computational power a miner has, the more likely it can be elected.
• Incentive structure: that keeps miners behaving honestly and extending the blockchain. In Bitcoin this is
achieved by miners getting a block discovery reward and transaction fees from users. In contrast, subverting
the protocol would reduce the trust of the currency and would lead to price loss. Hence, a miner would end
up undermining the currency that she itself collects.
Based on those two charateristics, several alternatives to Proof-of-Work have been proposed.
2.2 Proof of Stake
Proof of Stake(PoS) is an alternative to PoW for blockchains. Instead of using puzzle solving, PoS is more of a lottery
system. Each node has a certain amount of stake in a blockchain. Stake can be the amount of currency, or the age of
the coin that a miner holds. In PoS, the leader or block submitter is randomly elected with a probability proportional
to the amount of stake it owns in the system. For each block, a randomly elected participant can issue the next block.
The more stake a party has, the more likely it can be elected as a leader. Similarly to PoW, block issuing is rewarded
with transaction fees from participants whose data are included.
There are two major types of PoS. The first type is chain-based PoS [25], which uses chain of blocks like in PoW,
but stakeholders are randomly selected based on their stake to create new blocks. This includes Peercoin [26], Black-
coin [27], and Iddo Bentov’s work [28], just to name a few. The second type is BFT-based PoS that is based on BFT
consensus algorithms such as pBFT [7]. Proof of stake using BFT was first introduced by Tendermint [29], and has
attracted more research [30]. Ethereum had a plan to move from a PoW to a PoS blockchain [31].
PoS has a clear benefit (over PoW) since any node can join the network with even on cheap hardware such as a $35
Raspberry Pi. Every validator can submit blocks and the likelihood of acceptance is proportional to the % of network
weight (i.e., total amount of tokens being staked) they possess. Thus, to secure the blockchain, nodes need the actual
native token of that blockchain. To acquire the native tokens, one has to purchase or earn them with staking rewards.
Generally, gaining 51% of a network’s stake is much harder than renting computation.
Security Although PoS approach reduces the energy demand, new issues arise that were not present in PoW-based
blockchains. These issues are shown as follows:
• Grinding attack: Malicious nodes can play their bias in the election process to gain more rewards or to double
spend their money.
• Nothing at stake attack: In PoS, constructing alternative chains becomes easier. A node in PoS seemingly
does not lose anything by also mining on an alternative chain, whereas it would lose CPU time if working on
an alternative chain in PoW.
Delegated Proof of Stake To tackle the above issues in PoS, Delegated Proof of Stake (DPoS) consensus protocols are
introduced, such as Lisk, EOS [32], Steem [33], BitShares [34] and Ark [35]. DPoS uses voting to reach consensus
among nodes more efficiently by speeding up transactions and block creation. Users have different roles and have a
incentive to behave honestly in their role.
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In DPoS systems, users can vote to select witnesses, to whom they trust, to validate transactions. For top tier witnesses
that have earned most of the votes, they earn the right to validate transactions. Further, users can also delegate their
voting power to other users, whom they trust, to vote for witnesses on their behalf. In DPoS, votes are weighted based
on the stake of each voter. A user with a small stake can become a top tier witness, if it receives votes from users with
large stakes.
Top witnesses are responsible for validating transactions and creating blocks, and then get fee rewards. Witnesses in
the top tier can exclude certain transactions into the next block. But they cannot change the details of any transaction.
There are a limited number of witnesses in the system. A user can replace a top tier witness if s/he gets more votes or
is more trusted. Users can also vote to remove a top tier witness who has lost their trust. Thus, the potential loss of
income and reputation is the main incentive against malicious behavior in DPoS.
Users in DPoS systems also vote for a group of delegates, who are trusted parties responsible for maintaining the
network. The delegates are in charge of the governance and performance of the entire blockchain protocol. But the
delegates cannot do transaction validation and block generation. For example, they can propose to change block size,
or the reward a witness can earn from validating a block. The proposed changes will be voted by the system’s users.
DPoS brings various benefits: (1) faster than traditional PoW and PoS Stake systems; (2) enhance security and integrity
of the blockchains as each user has an incentive to perform their role honestly. (3) normal hardware is sufficient to
join the network and become a user, witness, or delegate. (4) more energy efficient than PoW.
Leasing Proof Of Stake Another type of widely known PoS is Leasing Proof Of Stake (LPoS). Like DPoS, LPoS
allows users to vote for a delegate that will maintain the integrity of the system. Further, users in a LPoS system can
lease out their coins and share the rewards gained by validating a block.
There are a number of surveys that give comprehensive details of PoW and PoS, such as [36, 37]. There are other
successors of PoS, such as Proof of Authority (PoA). In PoA, the reputation of the validator acts as the stake [38]. PoA
system is a permissioned system, which is controlled by a set of validators. Higher throughput can be achieved by
reducing the number of messages sent between the validators. Reputation is difficult to regain once lost and thus is a
better choice for “stake”.
2.3 DAG-based approaches
DAG-based approaches have currently emerged as a promising alternative to the PoW and PoS blockchains. The notion
of a DAG (directed acyclic graph) was first coined in 2015 by DagCoin [12]. Since then, DAG technology has been
adopted in numerous systems, for example, [12, 15, 16, 17, 18]. Unlike a blockchain, DAG-based system facilitate
consensus while achieving horizontal scalability. This section will present the popular DAG-based approaches.
Tangle is a DAG-based approach proposed by IOTA [19]. Tangle uses PoW to defend against sybil and spam attacks.
Good actors need to spend a considerable amount of computational power, but a bad actor has to spend increasing
amounts of power for diminishing returns. Tips based on transaction weights are used to address the double spending
and parasite attack.
Byteball [20] introduces an internal pay system called Bytes used in distributed database. Each storage unit is linked
to previous earlier storage units. The consensus ordering is computed from a single main chain consisting of roots.
Double spends are detected by a majority of roots in the chain.
Hashgraph [21] introduces an asynchronous DAG-based approach in which each block is connected with its own
ancestor. Nodes randomly communicate with each other about their known events. Famous blocks are computed by
using see and strong see relationship at each round. Block consensus is achieved with the quorum of more than 2/3 of
the nodes.
RaiBlocks [39] was proposed to improve high fees and slow transaction processing. Consensus is obtained through
the balance weighted vote on conflicting transactions. Each participating node manages its local data history. Block
generation is carried similarly as the anti-spam tool of PoW. The protocol requires verification of the entire history of
transactions when a new block is added.
Phantom [16] is a PoW based permissionless protocol that generalizes Nakamoto’s blockchain to a DAG. A parameter
k is used to adjust the tolerance level of the protocol to blocks that were created concurrently. The adjustment can
accommodate higher throughput; thus avoids the security-scalability tradeoff as in Satoshi’s protocol. A greedy algo-
rithm is used on the DAG to distinguish between blocks by honest nodes and the others. It allows a robust total order
of the blocks that is eventually agreed upon by all honest nodes.
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Like PHANTOM, the GHOSTDAG protocol selects a k-cluster, which induces a colouring of the blocks as Blues
(blocks in the selected cluster) and Reds (blocks outside the cluster). GHOSTDAG finds a cluster using a greedy
algorithm, rather than looking for the largest k-cluster.
Spectre [15] uses DAG in a PoW-based protocol to tolerate from attacks with up to 50% of the computational power.
The protocol gives a high throughput and fast confirmation time. Sprectre protocol satisfies weaker properties in which
the order between any two transactions can be decided from the transactions by honest users; whilst conventionally
the order must be decided by all non-corrupt nodes.
Conflux [18] is a DAG-based Nakamoto consensus protocol. It optimistically processes concurrent blocks without
discarding any forks. The protocol achieves consensus on a total order of the blocks, which is decided by all partici-
pants. Conflux can tolerate up to half of the network as malicious while the BFT-based approaches can only tolerate
up to one third of malicious nodes.
Parsec [17] proposes a consensus algorithm in a randomly synchronous BFT network. It has no leaders, no round
robin, no PoW and reaches eventual consensus with probability one. Parsec can reach consensus quicker than Hash-
graph [21]. The algorithm reaches 1/3-BFT consensus with very weak synchrony assumptions. Messages are delivered
with random delays, with a finite delay in average.
Blockmania [40] achieves consensus with several advantages over the traditional pBFT protocol. In Blockmania,
nodes in a quorum only emit blocks linking to other blocks, irrespective of the consensus state machine. The resulting
DAG of blocks is used to ensure consensus safety, finality and liveliness. It reduces the communication complexity to
O(N2) even in the worse case, as compared to pBFT’s complexity of O(N4).
In this paper, our StakeDag protocol is different from the previous work. We propose a general model of DAG-based
consensus protocols, which uses Proof of Stake for asynchronous permissionless BFT systems. StakeDag protocol
is based on our previous DAG-based protocols[1, 22] to achieve asynchronous non-deterministic pBFT. The new Sφ
protocol, which is based on our ONLAY framework [23], uses graph layering to achieve scalable, reliable consensus
in a leaderless aBFT DAG.
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3 A General Model of StakeDag Protocols
In this section, we present a general model of StakeDag protocols that are Proof of Stake DAG-based for trustless
systems. In this general model of a stake-based consensus protocol, the stakes of the participants are paramount to a
trust indicator.
A stake-based consensus protocol consists of nodes that vary in their amount of stakes. Presumingly, any participant
can join the network. Participants can increase their impact as well as their contributions over the Fantom network by
the amount of stakes or FTM tokens they possess. For those who obtain more FTM tokens, they have more validating
power to check for the validity of blocks and the underlying DAG.
We then introduce the key concepts of our StakeDag protocol as follows.
3.1 Stake
Each participant node of the system has an account. The stake of a participant is defined based on their account
balance. The account balance is the number of tokens that was purchased, accumulated and/or delegated from other
account. Each participant has an amount of stakes wi, which is a non-negative integer.
Each participant with a positive balance can join as part of the system. A user has a stake of 1, whereas a validator has
a stake of wi > 1. The number of stakes is the number of tokens that they can prove that they possess. In our model, a
participant, whose has a zero balance, cannot participate in the network, either for block creation nor block validation.
3.2 Validating Power and Validator Types
In our previous papers [1, 22], a family of Lachesis protocols was proposed. In Lachesis, every node can submit new
transactions, which are batched in a new event block, and it can communicate its new (own) event blocks with peers.
Blocks are then validated by all nodes, all of which have the same validating power.
Here, in this paper, we present a general model that distinguishes StakeDag participants by their validating power. In
this model, every node ni in S protocols has a stake value of wi. This value is then used to determine their trust or
validating power in validation of event blocks.
Every node inS protocols can create new event blocks and can communicate them with all other nodes. All the nodes
can validate the event blocks. Their validating power is determined by their stake wi.
Ideally, we could allow participants can do validation only without the need to participate into block creation, if they
wish. However, for an asynchronous DAG-based consensus, validators-only in StakeDag protocol still need to create
event block to indicate that which blocks (and all of its ancestors) have been validated.
There are two general types of validators that we are considered in this paper. They are described as follows.
• Validators as power nodes: Every node, either user or validator, can create and validate event blocks. Both
users and validators can submit new transactions via their new event blocks.
The only difference between users and validators of this type is that a validator has more validating power of,
say wi > 1, while a user has a validating power of 1.
• Validators as validation-only nodes: We now consider another type of validators. Users and validators of
this type play more specific roles. A user node can create new event blocks, which contain transactions. User
can validate any event blocks.
In this type, validators are validation-only nodes. Validators can create empty event blocks, but the event
blocks created by validator-only nodes contain no transactions. Validators can validate event blocks.
For stake-based consensus, the difference between the two validator types does not have any significant impact on
consensus. The two types are different with respect to the responsibility (validation) and the economic expectation
of a participant who joins the StakeDag protocol. In particular, the first type allows any validator to include new
transactions in the new event blocks it creates, while the second type prohibits validators from adding new transactions.
Remarkably, the resulting OPERA chains on the nodes are the same for two types of validators. Thus, the com-
putation of consensus does not change between these two types. The two models of validators are considered as
implementation-specific. In fact, the first type is more general than the second type.
For the sake of simplicity, we distinguish two types of nodes: users and validators. We consider only the first type of
validators, throughout the rest of the paper.
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3.3 Event Block Creation
In order to create a new event block, a node can choose a top event block(s) of another node as a parent. In StakeDag
protocol, users and validators can choose a top event block(s) of another node/validator node to as an other-parent
reference to the new event block. Prior to creating a new event block, the node will first validate its current block and
the selected top event block(s) from other node(s).
In a StakeDag protocol, each event block has k references to other event blocks using their hash values. The references
of a new event block satisfy the following conditions:
1. Each of the k referenced event blocks is the top event block of its own node.
2. One of the references must be a self-ref (or self-parent) that references to an event block of the same node.
3. The other k-1 references, which are also known as other-parent or other-ref references, refer to k-1 top event
blocks on other nodes.
3.4 S-OPERA chain: A Weighted DAG
In StakeDag protocol, a (participant) node is a server (machine) of the distributed system. Each node can create mes-
sages, send messages to and receive messages from other nodes. The communication between nodes is asynchronous.
Figure 3: An example of an S-OPERA chain in StakeDag. The validation scores of some selected blocks are shown.
Figure 3 depicts an S-OPERA chain obtained from the DAG. In this example, validators have validating power of
2, while users have validating power of 1. Blocks created by validators are highlighted in red color. First few event
blocks are marked with their validating power. Leaf event blocks are special as each of them has a validation score
equal to their creator’s validating power.
The core idea of StakeDag protocol is to use a DAG-based structure, namely S-OPERA chain, which is based on the
concept of OPERA chain in our Lachesis protocol [1]. S-OPERA chain is a weighted directed acyclic graphG=(V ,E),
where V is the set of event blocks, E is the set of edges between the event blocks. Each vertex (or event block) is
associated with a validation score. Each event block also has a validating score, which is the total weights of the roots
reachable from it. When an block becomes a root, it is assigned a weight, which is the same with the validating power
of the creator node.
LetW be the total validating power of all nodes. For consensus, the algorithm examines whether an event block has
a validation score of at least 2W/3. A validation score of 2W/3 means the event block has been validated by more
than two-thirds of total validating power in the S-OPERA chain.
3.5 Stake-based Validation
In StakeDag, we use the following validation process. A node, when validating blocks, never assumes the honesty
or dishonesty of any block creator. Instead it verifies the blocks just like other consensus engines operating in an
11
A PREPRINT - JULY 9, 2019
untrusted environment. A node must validate its current block and the received ones before it attempts to create or add
a new event block into its local DAG. A node must validate its (own) new event block before it communicates the new
block to other nodes.
Note that, StakeDag consensus protocols has a more general model than that of the Lachesis protocols [1]. All nodes
in Lachesis can be considered as ’user’ nodes in StakeDag, since the validating power is 1 by default.
A root is an important block that is used to compute the final consensus of the event blocks of the DAG. In Lachesis,
when a block can reach more than 2/3 of the roots of the network, it becomes a root. Unlike in Lachesis protocol,
StakeDag procol takes the stakes of participants into account to compute the consensus of blocks. A stake number of
a block is the sum of the validating power of the nodes whose roots can be reached from the block. When a block
receives more than 2/3 of the entire validating power of the network, it becomes a root.
3.6 Validation Score
When an event block can reach a root, it takes the validating power of the root’s creator. The validation score of a
block is the sum of accummulated validating powers that the block has gained. The validation score of a block vi ∈ G
is denoted by s(vi).
The validation score of a block is used to determine whether the block is a new root. If the block’s score is greater
than 2/3 of the total validating power, the block becomes a root. The weight of a root ri is denoted by w(ri), which is
the weight wj of the creator node j of the ri.
3.7 Flagtable Calculation
To quickly compute the validation score of event blocks, we introduce stake-based flagtable. Each flagtable is a
mapping of a root and the stake associated with the creator of that root.
Each event block has a flagtable that stores a set of the roots that are reachable from the block. For flagtable, we only
consider the roots in the current active root set.
The validation score of a block is computed as the sum of all validating powers of all the roots contained in the block’s
flagtable.
Figure 4: An Example of Flagtable
Figure 4 shows an example of flagtable calculation for event blocks. The current active root set contains five roots ra,
rb, rc, rd and re with their validating powers of 1, 2, 1, 2, 1, respectively. The flagtable of block rb contains a single
mapping entry (rb, 2), and thus the validation score of rb is the same with the validating power of node b, which is 2.
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The validating power of block c is the sum of 2 and 1, which gives a result of 3. Similarly, the validation scores of
blocks d and d′ are 4 and 5, respectively.
3.8 Root Selection
Figure 5 depicts the process of selecting a new root in StakeDag. A node can create a new event block or receive a
new block from other nodes. When a new event block is created, its flagtable is updated. Like in Lachesis protocol,
each block has a flagtable that contains the sets of roots that are reachable from the block.
Figure 5: The steps for root selection in StakeDag
Root events get consensus when 2/3 validating power is reached. When a new root is found, ’Assign weight’ step will
assign a weight to the root. The root’s weight is set to be equal to the validating power wi of its creator. The validation
score of a root is unchanged.
3.9 Main-chain
For faster consensus, we introduce the Main-chain, which is a special sub-graph of the S-OPERA chain. The Main
chain is an append-only list of blocks, that caches the final consensus ordering of the finalized Atropos blocks. The
local hashing chain is useful to improve path search to quickly determine the closest root to an event block. Root event
blocks are important blocks that reach 2/3 of the network power. After the topological ordering is computed over all
event block, Atropos blocks are determined and form the Main chain.
Each participant has an own copy of the Main chain and can search consensus position of its own event blocks from
the nearest Atropos. The chain provides quick access to the previous transaction history to efficiently process new
coming event blocks. With the Main chain, unknown participants or attackers can be easily detected.
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4 StakeDag Staking model
This section presents our staking model for PoS DAG-based StakeDag protocols. We first give general definitions and
variables of our staking model, and then present the model in details.
4.1 Definitions and Variables
Below are the general definitions and variables that are important in StakeDag protocol.
General definitions
F denotes the network itself
N the set of nodes in the network
SPV ”Special Purpose Vehicle” - a special smart contract acting as an internal market-maker for
FTG tokens, managing the collection of transaction fees and the payment of all rewards
FTM main network token
FTG network transaction token (gas)
E set of event blocks in F
E(d) set of all event blocks validated on day d, their number being |E(d)|
Accounts
U set of all participant accounts in the network
A ⊂ U accounts with a positive FTM token balance
AG ⊂ U accounts with a positive FTG token balance
S ⊆ A accounts that have staked for validation (some of which may not actually be
validators)
V ⊆ S validating accounts, corresponding to the set of the network’s validating nodes
A participant with an account having a positive FTM token balance, say i ∈ A, can join the network. But an account i
in S may not participate in the protocol yet. Those who join the network belong to the set V.
[Validating account] A validating account is an account with a positive FTM token balance.
Note that, the set of validating accounts V contain both users and validators, as presented in our general model in
Section 3.
Network parameters subject to on-chain governance decisions
F 3.175e9 total supply of FTM tokens
δ 30 period in days for determining Proof of Importance
λ 90 period in days after which validator staking must be renewed, to ensure activity
ε 1 minimum number of tokens that can be staked by an account for any purpose
θ 30% impact of Proof of Importance for rewards
ξ 50% impact of Proof of Importance for transaction staking
φ 30% SPV commission on transaction fees
µ 15% validator commission on delegated tokens
Tokens held and staked
Unless otherwise specified, any mention of tokens refers to FTM tokens.
[Token helding] The token helding ti of an account is number of FTM tokens held by account i ∈ A.
14
A PREPRINT - JULY 9, 2019
ti number of FTM tokens held by account i ∈ A
t
[x]
i > ε transaction-staked tokens by account i
t
[d]
i (s) > ε tokens delegated by account i to account s ∈ S
t[d](s) total of tokens delegated to account s ∈ S
t
[d]
i total of tokens delegated by account i to accounts in S
t
[s]
i validation-staked tokens by account i
T
[s]
min 0.1% minimum tokens staked by v ∈ V, as a percentage of F
T
[s]
max 0.4% maximum tokens staked by v ∈ V, as a percentage of F
M 15 delegation multiplier - maximum ratio of delegated versus staked tokens
Q multiplier - maximum fraction of staked or delegated tokens over the holding
The sum of tokens staked or delegated by an account i ∈ A cannot exceed the amount of tokens held:
t
[x]
i + t
[s]
i +
∑
s∈S
t
[d]
i (s) ≤ ti (1)
The following limits apply for token staked for validation by s ∈ S:
T
[s]
min · F ≤ t[s]s ≤ T [s]max · F
The total amount of tokens delegated to an account s ∈ S is:
t[d](s) =
∑
i∈A
t
[d]
i (s) (2)
The total amount of tokens delegated by an account i ∈ A is:
t
[d]
i =
∑
s∈S
t
[d]
i (s) (3)
The sum of tokens delegated to an account s ∈ S cannot exceed a fixed multiple of tokens staked by that account:
t[d](s) ≤M · t[s]s
Finally, there is a limit on the amount of tokens that can be transaction-staked or delegated:
t
[d]
i ≤ Q · ti t[x]i ≤ Q · ti
4.2 Absolute Weight Model
[Weight in F] The weight of an account i ∈ A is equal to its token holding ti.
[Importance in F] The importance is proportional to gas use in the overall network over the most recent period of δ
days.
The importance of a node i is computed by:
gˆi =
gi
G P, (4)
where
gi gas used by account i ∈ U during past δ days
G gas used in the entire network in past δ days. So G = ∑i∈U gi.
gˆi importance of i ∈ U, rebased to be comparable with ti
P the sum of all the network’s transacting power
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[Transacting Power] The transacting power of an account is defined as a weighted average of an account’s weight
and importance in F .
xi transacting power of account i ∈ U
X total transacting power of U. Thus, X =
∑
i∈U xi = P .
Transacting power of an account is computed by:
xi = ξgˆi + (1− ξ)ti (5)
Note that, the above model of transacting power includes a gas factor used in smart contracts. Without gas factor, the
transacting power of an account i ∈ U is simply given by xi = ti, which is the token helding of the account.
Network Performance and Transaction Slots
Π 5,000,000,000 Estimated maximum network processing power, in FTG per second
Θ 500,000 Estimated maximum network throughput, in Bytes per second
σg transacting power needed for a slot of 1 FTG per second
σb transacting power needed for a slot of 1 Byte/second of throughput
Given that at most F tokens can be transaction-staked, we have:
σg =
F
Π
≈ 0.635 σb = F
Θ
≈ 6350 (6)
4.3 Relative Weight Model
Since only a fraction of tokens are staked or delegated for validation, we define a relative weight in order to correctly
determine the total validating power of the entire network F .
[Weight in V] A relative weight of a validator v is a relative value of the validating power of v computed from the
total validating power of the entire network F .
wv tokens staked by, and delegated, to validator v ∈ V, which represents the weight of this validator
W total tokens staked by, and delegated to, validators. That is,W = ∑v∈V wv .
The relative weight of v is computed by:
wv = t
[s]
v +
∑
i∈A
t
[d]
i (v) = t
[s]
v + ti(v) (7)
[Importance in V] The importance in V is proportional to gas use by accounts that have staked or delegated tokens.
hˆv =
hv
HW, (8)
where
hv gas use over the past δ days attributable to validator v ∈ V. That is, hv = gv+
∑
i∈A gi
t
[d]
i (v)
ti
.
H total gas use over the past δ days attributable to all validators. SoH = ∑v∈V hv .
hˆv importance of v ∈ V, rebased to be comparable with wv
4.4 Validating power
We first present the simplest model of validating power, which is defined as the number of tokens held by an account.
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[Validating power - Simple] The validating power of a validator v ∈ V is defined as validator’s weight. The weight
of a validator can be the token helding ti, or the validator’s weight wv .
We then also present a general model of the validating power, as follows.
[Validator Score] The validator score is the score given for each validator v ∈ V.
sv ∈ [0, 1] the total score of validator v ∈ V
For each validator v ∈ V, validator score will be a number between 0 and 1 representing a composite of three different
performance metrics.
s
[w]
v ∈ [0, 1] validating performance score of v
s
[t]
v ∈ [0, 1] transaction origination score of v
s
[p]
v ∈ [0, 1] processing power score of v
[Validating power] The validating power of a validator is defined as a weighted average of a validator’s weight and
importance, multiplied by its score.
Thus, the validating power of a node is computed by:
pv = sv[θ · hˆv + (1− θ) · wv], (9)
where
pv validating power of validator v ∈ V
P total validating power of V. So P =
∑
v∈V pv .
Note that, Equation 9 gives a general model for calculating validating power, which includes the notion of gas-based
importance hv . The gas is used for smart contracts. When gas factor is not included, the validating power of an account
v ∈ V is simply given by pv = wv , which is the relative weight of v.
4.5 Block consensus and Rewards
We then present notations and definitions in our model of rewards.
[Validation score] Validation score of a block is the total validating power that a given block can achieve from the
validators v ∈ V.
[Validating threshold] Validating threshold is defined by 2/3 of the validating power that is needed to confirm an
event block to reach consensus.
Below are the variables that define the block rewards and their contributions for participants in Fantom network.
Z 996,341,176 total available block rewards of FTM , for distribution by the SPV during the
first 1460 days after mainnet launch
Fs FTM tokens held by the SPV
Fc F − Fs total circulating supply
B(d) total transaction fees paid by network users on day d
R[v](d) φ ∗B(d) total transaction rewards retained by the SPV on day d
R[x](d) (1− φ) ∗B(d) total transaction rewards to be distributed on day d
R[b](d) total block rewards to be distributed on day d
R(d) R[x](d) +R[b](d) total rewards to be distributed on day d
Rv(d) R(d) ∗ (pv/P ) total daily rewards attributable to validator v ∈ V on day d, that will be paid
out to the validator and to all user accounts who have delegated tokens to that
validator
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D
[v]
i (d) total daily delegation rewards received by i ∈ A attributable to validator v ∈ V
on day d (exclusive of validator rewards)
Di(d)
∑
v∈VD
[v]
i (d) total delegation rewards received by i from all validators on day d
D[v](d)
∑
i∈AD
[v]
i (d) total delegation rewards received by all delegators attributable to validator v
Iv(d) daily validator rewards received by v ∈ V on day d (exclusive of delegation
rewards)
Block rewards will be distributed over 1460 days (4 years less one day) after launch, corresponding to Z/1460 per day
during that period:
Rb(d) =
{
682,425.46, during 1460 days after mainnet launch.
0, otherwise.
(10)
4.6 Token Staking and Delegation
FTM tokens will have multiple uses in the Fantom system. Participants can chose to stake or delegate tokens into their
accounts. When staking or delegating, the validating power of a node is based on the number of FTM tokens held,
plus other factors such as the “importance” to the network as measured by the gas (described in previous section).
We describe three potential ways for staking to achieve wealth.
[Transaction staking] Participants can gain more stakes or tokens via the transaction staking. Transaction submitters
will gain transaction fees if the transactions are successfully validated and reach finality. This style of staking helps
increases transaction volume on the network. The more liquidity, the more transaction staking they can gain.
[Validation staking] By validating blocks, a participant can gain validation rewards. Honest participants can gain
block rewards for successfully validated blocks.
With validation staking, one can join the network using a moderate hardware and a certain small amount of tokens.
Once participating the network, the participant can achieve block rewards for blocks that they co-validated and gain
transaction fees from transaction submitters for the successfully finalized transactions. The more stake they gain, the
validating power they will have and thus the more rewards they can receive as it is proportional to their validating
power.
[Validation delegation] Validation deligation allows a participant to deligate all or part of their tokens to another
participant(s). Deligating participants can gain a share of block rewards and transaction fees, based on the amount of
delegated stake.
Our model of delegation of stakes between participants allow various coordination amongst participants. Early stage
participants can borrow stake from other participants to gain more rewards. Meanwhile, participants with large amount
of stakes can deligate their stakes to another participant while still earning some shared rewards.
4.6.1 Delegating Staking
Stakeholders will be able delegate a portion of their tokens to validating nodes. Validators will not be able to spend
delegated tokens, which will remain secured in the stakeholder’s own address. Validators will receive a fixed proportion
of the validator fees attributable to delegators.
Participants are compared by their performance. Higher performing node, with high uptimes and successful validation
rates, will earn more rewards. Delegators will be incentivised to choose nodes that have a high validator score, i.e. are
honest and high performing.
Delegators can delegate their tokens for a maximum period of days, after which they need to re-delegate. The require-
ments to delegate are minimal:
• Security deposit: None
• Minimum number of tokens to delegate: 1
• Minimum lock period: None
• Maximum number of validators a user can delegate to: None
18
A PREPRINT - JULY 9, 2019
• Maximum number of tokens that can be delegated to a validator: 15 times the number of tokens the validator
is staking
4.6.2 Transaction-Based Staking
We present more details of transaction-based staking used in StakeDag. With transaction-based staking, FTM holders
can stake a portion of their tokens to secure a guaranteed transaction volume on the network.
Staking tokens gives FTM holders a guaranteed transaction slot, which consists of the following:
• gas: expressed in FTG/second
• data throughput: expressed in Bytes/second
The size of the issued slot will be proportional to the transacting power of the tokens staked.
Network Processing Power and Throughput Here, we give an estimate of the maximum gas that can be spent
per second. The gas usage depends heavily on the processing power. At the year of this writing, the best desktop
processors (such as the Intel Core i9 Extreme Edition) have already reached teraflop speeds - one trillion floating point
operations per second.
Every instruction processed by the Fantom Virtual Machine (”FVM”) will carry some overhead, as it has to verify
signatures and track gas spent. The below gives an estimate:
• Assume that only 10% of processing power is available for executing transactions and smart contracts. Also
assume that a single multiplication by the FVM costs 100 floating-point operations.
• FVM can process one billion multiplications per second (i.e 5 billion gas - utilising Ethereum’s gas pricing
as a guide).
• 5, 000, 000, 000/21, 000 = 238, 095 basic transactions, which are simple transfers of value from one address
to another.
• A basic transaction has, on average, a size of 120 bytes.
• This would result in a data volume of 230, 095 ∗ 120 = 27 MB / second.
From the above, a data volume of 27 MB per second is for new transactions. When consensus protocol traffic is taken
into account, it becomes quite too high. This means that if the majority of transactions are relatively simple, the main
bottleneck will be network throughput.
The current assumptions are:
• F can support 5 billion gas / second.
• A reasonably high maximum transaction throughput of 0.5MB / second.
Staking Now we show an example of staking. Assume that each basic transaction has a size of 120 Bytes on average.
In order to be guaranteed one basic transaction per second, a user would need to stake tokens with a transacting power
corresponding 120∗6, 350 = 762, 000. If that user’s gas usage is in line with his token holdings, his transacting power
will be roughly equal to his token holdings. Thus, the necessary number of transaction-staked FTM tokens will also
be approximately 762,000. This corresponds to 762, 000/0.635 ≈ 1, 200, 000 FTG per second.
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5 Layering-based StakeDag: Sφ Protocol
In this section, we present a specific PoS DAG-based protocol, namely Sφ, of the family S. Our general model of
StakeDag protocols is presented in Section 3. Sφ protocol is a layering-based approach, which is based on our ONLAY
framework [23]. Sφ provides a PoS DAG-based solution to build scalable asynchronous distributed ledgers.
5.1 Framework
We first give an overal design of the Sφ protocol. Figure 6 shows the overall framework of layering-based StakeDag
protocol. Like the general model in Figure 1, Sφ protocol includes the steps to update flagtable and validation score for
each new event block. Once a block receives more than 2/3 of the validating power of the network, the block becomes
a root.
Figure 6: An Overview of Layering-based StakeDag Protocol
The figure also depicts extra steps used in Sφ protocol. The main difference with the general model is that Sφ leverages
layering and hierarchical graph obtained from a layering step. Like in ONLAY [23], the layer information of the event
blocks are used to achieve reliable frame assignment and consensus of finally ordered event blocks. The root graph
serves as a convenient data structure to help find new root, detect possible forks and assign new frame to event blocks.
5.2 Main procedure
Algorithm 1 shows the main function serving as the entry point to launch StakeDag protocol. The main function
consists of two main loops, which are they run asynchronously in parallel. The first loop attempts to request for new
nodes from other nodes, to create new event blocks and then communicate about them with all other nodes. The
second loop will accept any incoming sync request from other nodes. The node will retrieve updates from other nodes
and will then send responses that consist of its known events.
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Algorithm 1 StakeDag Main Function
1: function MAIN FUNCTION
2: loop:
3: Let {ni} ← k-PeerSelectionAlgo()
4: Sync request to each node in {ni}
5: (SyncPeer) all known events to each node in {ni}
6: Create new event block: newBlock(n, {ni})
7: (SyncOther) Broadcast out the message
8: Update DAG G
9: Call ComputeConsensus(G)
10: loop:
11: Accepts sync request from a node
12: Sync all known events by StakeDag protocol
1: function COMPUTECONSENSUS(DAG)
2: Apply layering to obtain H-OPERA chain*
3: Update flagtable
4: Compute validation score*
5: Root selection
6: Compute root graph*
7: Compute global state
8: Clotho selection
9: Atropos selection
10: Order vertices and assign consensus time
11: Compute Main chain
In the first loop, a node makes synchronization requests to k-1 other nodes to retrieve their top event blocks. It
then creates event blocks that references those received event blocks. Once created, the blocks are broadcasted to all
other nodes. In line 3, each node runs the Node Selection Algorithm, to find the next k-1 nodes that it will need to
communicate with. In line 4 and 5, the node sends synchronization requests to get the latest OPERA chain of these
nodes. After the latest event blocks are received in the responses, the node creates new event blocks (line 6), and it
then broadcasts the created event block to all other nodes (line 7). After creating a new event block, the node updates
its OPERA chain and then call compute consensus function (line 8 and 9).
The ComputeConsensus function first applies layering on the DAG (line 2). After layering is performed, H-OPERA
chain is obtained. For each new event block, it updates the flagtable, which includes roots reachable from the block
(line 3). Then from the flagtable, validation score is computed based on the weights of the reachable roots (line 4).
It then checks whether the block is a root (line 5) and build/update the root graph (line 6). In line 7, it recomputes a
global state based on its local H-OPERA chain. Then the node decides which roots become Clothos (line 8) and which
then becomes Atropos (line 9). When new Atropos vertices are confirmed, the algorithm runs a topological sort to get
the final ordering for unsorted vertices for final consensus (line 10). Lastly, the main chain is constructed from the
Atropos vertices that are newly found and sorted (line 11).
5.3 Peer selection algorithm
In order to create a new event block, a node in StakeDag protocol needs to synchronize with k-1 other nodes for their
latest top event blocks. A peer selection algorithm computes a set of k-1 nodes that a node should synchronize with.
There are multiple ways to select k - 1 nodes from the set of n nodes. Examples of peer selection algorithms that are
mentioned in our previous paper [23] include: (1) random peer from n peers; (2) the least / most used peer(s); (3) aim
for a balanced distribution; (4) based on some other criteria, such as network latency, successful rates, number of own
events. In general, our protocol does not depend on how peer nodes are selected.
Stake-based Peer Selection We also propose new peer selection algorithms, which utilize stakes to select the next
peer. Each node has a mapping of the peer i and the frequency fi showing how many times that peer was selected.
These new peer selection algorithms are adapted from the ones above, but take user stakes into account. We give a few
examples of the new algorithms, described as follows:
1. Stake-based selection : select a random peer from n peers with a probability proportional to their stakes wi.
2. Least used selection: select the peer with the lowest values of fi ∗ wi.
3. Most used selection: select the peer with the highest values of fi ∗ wi.
4. Balance selection: aim for a balanced distribution of selected peers of a node, based on the values fi ∗ wi.
There are other possible ways to integrate stakes and stake-related criteria into a peer selection algorithm. For example,
we can define new algorithms based some other criteria, such as successful validation rates, total rewards, etc.
5.4 Peer synchronization
Now we describe the steps to synchronize events between the nodes, as presented in Algorithm 2. In the Event
synchronization function, each node n1 selects a random peer n2 (from the set of peers computed by peer selection
algorithm). It then sends a sync request consisting of the local known events of n1 to n2. After receiving the sync
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request from n1, n2 will compute an event diff with its own known events and will then return the unknown events to
n1. The algorithm assumes that a node always needs the events in topological ordering (specifically in reference to the
lamport timestamps). Alternatively, one can simply use a fixed incrementing index or layer assignment to keep track
of the top event for each node.
Algorithm 2 Peer Synchronization
1: function SYNC-EVENTS()
2: n1 selects a random peer n2 to synchronize with
3: n1 gets local known events (map[int]int)
4: n1 sends a RPC Sync request to peer
5: n2 receives a RPC Sync request
6: n2 does an EventDiff check on the known event
map (map[int]int)
7: n2 returns the unknown events to n1
1: function SYNC-STAKES()
2: n1 selects a random peer n2 to synchronize with
3: n1 gets stake updates (map[int]int)
4: n1 sends a RPC Sync request to peer
5: n2 receives a RPC Sync request
6: n2 does an StakeDiff check on the peer-stake
map (map[int]int)
7: n2 returns update stakes to n1
For stake synchronization, the function works in a similar manner. Each node n1 computes any new stake updates in
its local view. It will select a random peer n2 and then sends a sync request consisting of the local stake updates of n1
to n2. After receiving the sync request from n1, n2 will compute a stake diff with its own known stake values and will
then return new events to n1. Note that, any changes to a user’s stake can only be applied and updated after a certain
check points. For simplicity, we assume that stake synchronization is done between nodes for every 20th frame.
5.5 Node Structure
This section gives an overview of the node structure in StakeDag. A node in StakeDag system is associated with a
stakeholder that participates with other nodes in the network.
Figure 7: StakeDag node structure
Figure 7 shows the structure of a node. Each node consists of an S-OPERA (Stake-based) chain of event blocks,
which is the local view of the DAG. Each node stores the account information of all nodes including itself. The
account information includes the account id and its current token helding in each account. There are other details
including tokens, delegated tokens, as described in Section 4. For the sake of simplicity, we only show the account
balance (e.g., number of tokens). The stakes are then computed from account balance of all nodes. Total validating
power and validating threshold are updated accordingly.
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In each node, it stores the layering information (the resulting H-OPERA chain), roots, root graph, frames, Clotho set
and Atropos set. The top event block of each peer is the most recently created / received event block by that peer node.
A block can become a root if it receives more than the validating threshold, which is 2/3 of the validating power of the
network. A root will become a Clotho when it is further known by another root. A frame contains a set of roots of that
frame. When a root becomes Clotho, its Clotho flag is set on and then it is sorted and assigned a final ordering number.
After getting the final ordering, the Clotho is then promoted to an Atropos. The Main-chain is a data structure storing
hash values of the Atropos blocks.
5.6 Event block creation
Like previous Lachesis protocol [1], Sφ protocol allows every node to create event blocks. In order to generate a new
event block, a node i sends synchronization requests to k - 1 other nodes to get their latest event blocks. Then node
i can create a new event block. A new event block has k references: one is self-ref referencing the top event block
of the same node, k-1 other references referencing the top event blocks of k-1 peers. With cryptographic hashing, an
event block can only be created or added if the self-ref and other-ref event blocks exist.
5.7 Layering
We then present the main concepts and algorithms of the Sφ protocol in our StakeDag framework. This layering-based
PoS approach is based on our ONLAY paper [23]. Intuitively, Sφ integrates layering algorithms on the S-OPERA
chain and then use the assigned layers reach consensus of the event blocks.
For a DAG G=(V ,E), a layering φ of G is a mapping φ : V → Z, such that for any directed edge (u,v) ∈ E, the layer
of the source v is greater than the layer of the sink u; that is, φ(v) ≥ φ(u) + 1. Thus, φ partitions the set of vertices V
into a finite number of non-empty disjoint subsets (called layers) V1,V2,. . . , Vl, such that V = ∪li=1Vi. Each vertex is
assigned to a layer Vi.
Recall that S-OPERA chain is a DAG G=(V ,E) stored in each node. Each vertex in V is an event block, which has a
validation score. By applying φ on the S-OPERA chain, one can obtain the hierarchical graph of G, which is called
H-OPERA chain, which is the resulting hierarchical graph H = (V,E, φ). One can apply either LongestPathLayer
(LPL) algorithm or Coffman-Graham (CG) algorithm on the graph G (see details in [23]).
In StakeDag, the S-OPERA chain is evolunary as each node creates and synchronizes events with each other.Let
us consider a model of dynamic S-OPERA chain. For a node i, let G=(V ,E) be the current S-OPERA chain and
G′=(V ′,E′) denote the diff graph, which consists of the changes to G at a time, either at block creation or block
arrival.The vertex sets V and V ′ are disjoint; similar to the edge sets E and E′. At each graph update, the updated
S-OPERA chain becomes Gnew=(V ∪ V ′, E ∪ E′).
5.7.1 Online Layer Assignment
We adopt the online layering algorithms introduced in [23]. Specifically, we use Online Longest Path Layering (O-
LPL) and Online Coffman-Graham (O-CG) algorithm, which assign layers to the vertices in diff graph G′=(V ′,E′)
consisting of new self events and received unknown events. The algorithms are efficient and scalable to compute the
layering of large dynamic S-OPERA chain. Event blocks from a new graph update are sorted in topological order
before being assigned layering information. The two algorithms are presented in Appendix ??.
5.7.2 Layer Width Analysis in BFT
We then give ourformal analysis of the layering algorithms with respect to the Byzantine fault tolerance. BFT addresses
the functioning stability of the network when Byzantine nodes may take up toW/3 validating power, whereW is the
total validating power of the network.
Let φLP denote the layering of G obtained from LongestPathLayering algorithm. Let φCG(Wmax) denote the layering
of G obtained from the Coffman-Graham algorithm with some fixed width Wmax.
Byzantine free network We first consider the case in which the network is free from any faulty nodes; all nodes are
honest and thus zero fork exists.
Proposition 5.1. In the absense of dishonest nodes, the width of each layer Li is at most n.
This can be easily proved by induction. Since there are n nodes, there are n leaf vertices. The width of the first layer
L1 is n at maximum, otherwise there exists a fork, which is not possible. We assume that the theorem holds for every
layer from 1 to i. That is, the Li at each layer has the width of at most n. We will prove it holds for layer i+ 1 as well.
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Since each honest node can create at most one event block on each layer, the width at each layer is at most n. We can
prove by contradiction. Suppose there exists a layer |φi+1| > n. Then there must exist at least two events vp, vq on
layer φi+1 such that vp and vq have the same creator, say node ni. That means vp and vq are the forks of node ni. It
is a contradiction with the assumption that there is no fork. Thus, the width of each layer |φi+1| ≤ n. It is proved.
Thus, in the absence of forks, LongestPathLayering(G) and CoffmanGraham(G,n) computes the same layer assign-
ment. That is, φLP and φCG(n) are identical; or ∀v ∈ G, φLP (v) = φCG(n)(v).
1/3-BFT Now, let us consider the layering result for the network with at mostW/3 validating power are compromised.
In this case, there are about n/3 dishonest nodes in average, and about n-1 dishonest nodes in the worst case.
Without loss of generality, let wp be the probability that a node can create fork. Let wc be the maximum number of
forks a faulty node can create at a time. The number of forked events a node can create at a time is wpwc. The number
of fork events at each layer is given by Wfork = (n− 1)wpwc. Thus, the maximum width of each layer is given by:
Wmax = n+Wfork = n+ (n− 1)wpwc ≈ (1 + wpwc)n
Thus, if we set the maximum width high enough to tolerate the potential existence of forks, we can achieve BFT of
the layering result. The following theorem states the BFT of LPL and CG algorithms.
LongestPathLayering(G) and CoffmanGraham(G, Wmax) computes the same layer assignment. That is, φLP and
φCG(Wmax) are identical; or for each vertex v ∈ G, φLP (v) = φCG(Wmax)(v).
5.7.3 Root Graph
With layering information, we propose to a new data structure, called root graph, which gives a more efficient way
to compute new roots. The root graph can be used together with the layers for fast computation of frames. This data
structure is slightly different from the one in [23] as we use validating powers of roots instead of the root count.
[Root graph] A root graph GR=(VR, ER) is a directed graph consisting of roots as vertices, and their reachable
connections as edges.
The root graph GR = (VR, ER) contains vertices as roots VR ⊆ V , and the set of edges ER the reduced edges from
E, such that (u, v) ∈ ER only if u and v are roots and there is a path from u to v following edges in E. The root graph
initially contains the n genesis vertices — leaf event blocks. When a vertex v reaches 2W/3 of the validating power
of the current root set VR, it becomes a root. For each root ri that new root r reaches, we include a new edge (r, ri)
into the set of root edges ER. If a root r reaches two roots r1 and r2 of the same node, then we retain only one edge
(r, r1) or (r, r2) if φ(r1) > φ(r2). This requirement makes sure each root of a node can have at most one edge to any
other node.
Algorithm 3 Root graph algorithm
1: Require: H-OPERA chain H
2: Output: root graph GR = (VR, ER)
3: R← set of leaf events
4: VR ← R
5: ER ← ∅
6: function BUILDROOTGRAPH(H , φ, l)
7: for each layer i=1..l do
8: Z ← ∅
9: for each vertex v in layer φi do
10: S ← the set of vertices in R that v reaches
11: wS ← the total weights of roots in S (*)
12: if wS > 2W/3 then (*)
13: for each root ri ∈ S do
14: ER ← ER ∪ {(v, ri)}
15: VR ← VR ∪ {v}
16: Z ← Z ∪ {v}
17: for each vertex vj ∈ Z do
18: Let vold be a root in R such that cr(vj) = cr(vold)
19: R← R \ {vold} ∪ {vj}
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5.8 Root selection
For StakeDag, we propose a new approach that uses root graph and frame assignment. One can also use a Root
selection algorithm described in our previous paper [22].
The steps to build the root graph out of an H-OPERA chain is given in Algorithm 3. At the start of each layer, Z is
set to an empty set. The algorithm processes from layer 0 to the maximum layer l. R is the set of current active roots.
At initial stage, R contains only the the n genesis vertices — leaf event blocks (Line 3). We will update the set after
finding new roots at each layer. Line 4 and 5 set the initial value of the vertex set and edge set of the root graph. For
each layer i, it runs the steps from line 8 to 18. Let Z denote the set of new roots found at layer i. Z is initially set
to empty (Line 8). We then process each vertex v in the layer φi (line 9). We compute the set S of all active roots in
R that v can reach (Line 10). The total weight wS is computed as the total weights of all roots in R (Line 11). wS is
the validation score of v. If wS is greater than 2W/3, v becomes a new root (line 12). For every root ri in S, we add
an edge (v, ri) into ER (line 13-14). In lines 15-16, we add v into VR, and also into Z to keep to keep track of the
new roots found at layer i. The second inner loop will replace any new roots found at layer i with the existing ones in
current active set R (line 17-19).
The algorithm always updates the active set R of roots at each layer. The number of active roots in R is always n,
though the active roots can be from different layers.
5.9 Clotho selection
For pBFT, consensus is reached once an event block is known by more than 2/3n of the nodes and that information is
further known by 2/3n of the nodes.
In our PoS Sφ protocol, we define the consensus of a root as the condition the root becomes a Clotho. If it can
be reached by more than 2W/3 validating power of the roots and the information is confirmed by another 2W/3
validating power of the roots. That is, for a root r at frame fi, if there exists a root r′ at a frame fj such that r′ reaches
r and j ≥ i+2, then the root r reaches pBFT consensus. The root r′ is called the nominator, which nominates r to
become a Clotho.
Proposition 5.2 (Global Clotho). For any two honest nodes ni and nj , if c is a Clotho in Hi of ni, then c is also a
Clotho in Hj of nj .
Assume a block r that exists in both nodes ni and nj . Since honest nodes are consistent nodes, then the subgraphs
G[r] and G′[r] are the same on both nodes. Suppose r nominates a root c to be a Clotho in ni. Because the subgraphs
are identical, it can be deduced that r also nominates the same root c as a Clotho in nj .
5.10 Atropos Selection
When new Clotho event blocks are found, we will order them and then will assign the final consensus time for them.
We first sort the Clothos based on topological ordering. Section 5.13 gives more details on the topological ordering
and consensus time assignment.
Once a Clotho is assigned with a consensus time, it becomes an Atropos. Each node stores the hash value of Atropos
and Atropos consensus time in the Main-Chain (blockchain). The Main-chain is used for quick retrieval of the final
ordering between event blocks.
Proposition 5.3 (Global Atropos). For any two honest nodes ni and nj , if a is an Atropos in Hi of ni, then a is also
an Atropos in Hj of nj .
From the above Global Clotho proposition, a root is a Clotho in ni then it is also a Clotho in nj . The layering is
deterministic and so is the topological sorting. Hence, the sorted list of Clothos on two nodes are identical. Thus, the
assigned consensus time for the Clotho c is the same on both nodes. An Atropos block a in ni is also an Atropos in
nj , and they have the same consensus time.
5.11 Frame Assignment
We then present a deterministic approach to frame assignment, which assigns each event block a unique frame number.
First, we show how to assign frames to root vertices via the so-called root-layering. For a root graph GR = (VR, ER),
we assign frame number to roots vr of VR as a function φR, as follows:
• φR(u) ≥ φR(v) + 1, ∀(u, v) ∈ ER.
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• if u reaches at least 2W/3 validating power of the roots of frame i, then φR(v) = i+ 1.
Second, we then assign frame numbers to non-root vertices with respect to the topological ordering of the vertices.
The frame assignment to roots are used to assign frames to non-root vertices. For vertices in the layers between layer
i and layer i +1, the vertices are assigned the frame number i.
5.12 Fork detection and removal
When a node n receives a Sync request from another node, n will check if the received events would cause a fork. In
1/3-BFT system, we can prove that there exists an honest node that sees the fork. That honest node will remove one
of the forked events from its S-OPERA chain and will then notify the fork to all other nodes.
[Fork] Two events vx and vy form a fork if they have the same creator, but neither is a self-ancestor of the other.
Denoted by vx t vy .
The fork relation is symmetric; that is vx t vy iff vy t vx. For two events vx and vy of the same creator, we can prove
the following: vx t vy iff vx ‖ vy . By definition of fork, (vx, vy) is a fork implies that vx 6↪→a vy and vy 6↪→a vx. It
means vx 6→ vy and vy 6→ vx (by Happened-Before) and thus vx ‖ vy (by definition of concurrent).
Lemma 5.4. (Fork Detection). If there is a fork vx t vy , then vx and vy cannot both be roots on two honest nodes.
Proof. Since any honest node cannot accept a fork, vx and vy cannot be roots on a single honest node. Now we prove
a more general case, showing a proof by contradiction.
Suppose that vx is a root of nx, and vy is root of ny , where nx and ny are two distict honest nodes. Because vx is a
root, it reached roots of node set S1 whose weights account for more than 2/3 of total validating power. Similarly, vy
is a root, it reached roots of node set S2 that has a total weight greater than 2W/3. Thus, there must exist an overlap
of two sets S1 and S2, whose total weights is more than W/3. For 1/3-BFT system, it is assumed that dishonest nodes
account for less than W /3 of the power. Hence, there must be at least one honest member in the overlap set. Let nh
be such an honest member. As nh is honest, nh does not accept the fork. This gives a contradiction. The lemma is
proved.
When an honest node finds a new root r, there is a guarantee that there exists no forked events in the subgraph under
r. If there were, the fork should have been detected and removed prior to the promotion of r.
Proposition 5.5 (Fork-free). For any Clotho c, the subgraph G[c] is fork-free.
When c became a root, any forks under the subgraph G[c] has already been detected and removed from G. The node
then notified / synchronized with peers about the forks it found, and also might receive any notified forks from other
peers. By definition of Clotho, c is known by roots reached 2W/3 validating power and those are in turn known by
another set of roots of 2W/3 validating power. Thus, there exist nodes with more than 2W/3 validating power knew
about and removed the detected forks via peer synchronization.
Proposition 5.6 (Fork-free Global chain). The global consistent OPERA chain GC is fork-free.
Recall that the global consistent chain GC consists of the finalised events i.e., the Clothos and its subgraphs that get
final ordering at consensus. Those finally ordered Clothos are Atropos vertices. From the above proposition, for every
Clotho vc, there is no fork in its subgraph G[vc]. Thus, we can prove by processing the Clothos in topological order
from lowest to highest.
5.13 Topological sort
After new Clothos are found, the protocol will compute the final ordering for the Clothos as well as the vertices under
them. Once the final total order is computed, finalized vertices are assigned with a consensus time.
We present an approach to ordering event blocks that reach finality. Algorithm 4 gives our topological sort algorithm.
The algorithm takes as input the set of new Clothos C, the H-OPERA chain, layering assignment φ, frame assignment
φS , current ordered list S, and set of all ordered blocks U . Initially, the list S and the set U are empty (line 1-2).
We first order the Clothos vertices using SortByLayer function, which sorts vertices based on their layer, then
lamport timestamp and then hash information of the event blocks (line 12-13). Second, the algorithm processes every
Clotho in the sorted order (line 5). For each Clotho c, the algorithm computes the subgraph G[c] = (Vc, Ec) under
c (line 6). The set of vertices Vu contains vertices from Vc that is not yet processed in U (line 7). We then apply
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SortByLayer to order vertices in Vu to get an ordered list of events T . For each event block v in T , it appends v into
the final ordered list S and also adds v into the set of already processed vertices U .
Algorithm 4 Topological Sort
1: S ← empty list
2: U ← ∅
3: function TOPOSORT(C, H , φ, φF , S, U )
4: Q← SortByLayer(C)
5: for each Clotho c ∈ Q do
6: Compute the graph G[c] = (Vc, Ec)
7: Vu ← Vc \ U
8: T ← SortByLayer(Vu)
9: for v ∈ T do
10: Append v at the end S
11: U ← U ∪ {v}
12: function SORTBYLAYER(K)
13: Sort the vertices in K by layer, Lamport timestamp and hash in that order.
After the final order of event blocks are computed using the above algorithm, we can assign the consensus time to the
finally ordered event blocks. We can prove that the algorithm will sort and assign the final ordering index for each
event block once. A proof by induction is fairly straight-forward.
5.14 Transaction confirmations
Here are some steps for a transaction to reach finality in our system, similar to our previous paper [23]. In a successful
scenario, five confirmations will be issued and the fifth receipt is the final confirmation of a successful transaction.
First, after a client submits a transaction, s/he will be issued a confirmation receipt of the submitted transaction.
Second, the node will batch the submitted transaction(s) into a new event block added into the node’s DAG and it will
broadcast the event block to all other nodes of the system. A receipt will be then issued to confirm the containing
event block identifier is being processed. Third, when the event block receives the majority of the validating power
(e.g., it becomes a Root block), or being known by such a Root block, a confirmation will be issued to acknowledge
the block has reached that 2/3 validating power. Fourth, when the Root event block becomes a Clotho. A confirmation
will be sent to the client showing that the event block has come to the semi-final stage as a Clotho or being confirmed
by a Clotho. Fifth, after the Clotho stage, we will determine the consensus timestamp for the Clotho and its dependent
event blocks. Once an event block gets the final consensus timestamp, it is finalized and a final confirmation will be
issued to the client that the transaction has been successfully finalized.
In some cases, a submitted transaction can fail to reach finality. For example, a transaction does not pass the validation
due to insufficient account balance, or violation of account rules. The other kind of failure is when the integrity of DAG
structure and event blocks is not complied due to the existence of compromised or faulty nodes. In such unsuccessful
cases, the event blocks are marked for removal and detected issues are notified to all nodes. Receipts of the failure will
be sent to the client.
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6 Discussions
This section presents several important discussions about PoW and PoS previous work. There has been extensive
research in the protocol fairness and security aspects of existing PoW and PoS blockchains (see surveys [36, 37]).
Then we also highlight the benefits of our proposed DAG-based PoS approach.
6.1 Protocol Fairness
Here, the common concerns about fairness in PoW and PoS in previous protocols are given as follows:
• PoW protocol is fair in the sense that a miner with p fraction of the total computational power can win the
reward and create a block with the probability p.
• PoS protocol is fair given that an individual node who has p fraction of the total number of coins in circulation
creates a new block with p probability. In a PoS system, there is always a concern that the initial holders of
coins will not have an incentive to release their coins to third parties, as the coin balance directly contributes
to their wealth.
Our StakeDag protocol is fair because every node has an equal chance to create an event block. A protocol inS family
allows node to enter the network without the need to equip an expensive and high-spec hardward like in PoW. Further,
any node inS protocol can create a new event block with the same propability, unlike stake-based probability of block
creation in POS blockchains.
Like a PoS blockchain system, it is a possible concern that the initial holders of coins will not have an incentive to
release their coins to third parties, as the coin balance directly contributes to their wealth. Unlike PoS, that concern in
StakeDag protocol is about the economic rewards a StakeDag node may get is proportional to the stake they possess
after they successfully contribute to the validation of event blocks.
Remarkably, our StakeDag protocol is more intuitive because our reward model used in stake-based validation can
lead to a more reliable and sustainable network.
6.2 Validation Procedure
For validation in StakeDag, all the validators will be weighted by the tokens in their deposit. A block reaches consensus
when it gains more than 2/3 of the network stake. That means, it is agreed by a set of validators whose stakes are greater
than 2/3 of the total network stake.
Our DAG-based PoS approach makes some improvements in validation procedure over the previous PoS approaches.
In particular, StakeDag protocol utilizes the following validation procedure, which is based on the Casper PoS
model [31]. Our approach can be summarised as follows:
• Each block is 1-20 seconds and each frame is 1-10 minutes. Every 20th frame is a checkpoint. Stakeholders
can choose to make more deposits at each check point, if they want to become validators and earn more
rewards. Validators can choose to exit, but cannot withdraw their deposits until three months later.
• With asynchronous system model, frames and accounts may be not synchronized and validators are incen-
tivized to coordinate on which checkpoints the history should be updated. This coordination is carried out by
broadcasting the latest local views amongst nodes.
• A checkpoint is selected based on a consistent global history that is finalized with more than 2/3 of the
validating power for the checkpoint. When a checkpoint is finalized, the transactions will not be reverted.
Attackers can attempt double voting to target double spending attachs. Honest validators are incentivized to
report such behaviors and burn the deposits of the attackers.
6.3 Security
PoS approach reduces the energy demand, compared to PoW. PoS is considered as more secure than PoW. This section
gives some security analysis of PoW, PoS and our StakeDag protocol.
Overall Comparison As for a guidelines, we present a summary that gives the effects of the common types of attack
on previous protocols.
Table 14 gives a comparison between PoW, PoS, DPoS and our StakeDag protocol. Generally speaking, StakeDag has
less vulnerabilities than PoW, PoS and DPoS.
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Attack type PoW PoS DPoS StakeDag
Short range attack (e.g., bribe) - + - -
Long range attack - + + maybe
Coin age accummulation attack - maybe - maybe
Precomputing attack - + - -
Denial of service + + + +
Sybil attack + + + maybe
Selfish mining maybe - - -
Table 14: Comparison of Vulnerability Between PoW, PoS, DPoS and StakeDag Protols
PoW vulnerabilities PoW-based systems are facing selfish mining attack. In selfish mining, an attacker selectively
reveals mined blocks in an attempt to waste computational resources of honest miners.
PoS vulnerabilities PoS has encountered new issues arise that were not present in PoW-based blockchains. These
issues are: (1) Grinding attack: malicious nodes can play their bias in the election process to gain more rewards or to
double spend their money: (2) Nothing at stake attack: A malicious node can mine on an alternative chain in PoS at
no cost, whereas it would lose CPU time if working on an alternative chain in PoW.
Shared vulnerabilities in PoW and PoS There are several vulnerabilities that are encountered by both PoW and PoS.
DoS attack and Sybil attack are shared vulnerables that PoW are found more vulnerable. A DoS attack disrupts the
network by flooding the nodes. In a Sybil attack, the attacker creates numerous faulty nodes to disrupt the network.
For another shared vulnerable Bribe attack, PoS is more vulnerable because a PoS Bribe attack costs 50x lower than
PoW Bribe attack. In bribing, the attacker performs a spending transaction, and at the same time builds an alternative
chain secretely, based on the block prior to the one containing the transaction. After the transaction gains the necessary
number of confirmations, the attacker publishes his chain as the new valid blockchain, and the transaction is reversed.
PoS potential attacks We then discuss two scenarios that are possible attacks in PoS. Both of these attacks can induce
conflicting finalized checkpoints that will require offline coordination by honest users.
Double-Spending An attacker (a) acquires 2F/3 of stakes; (b) submits a transaction to spend some amount and then
votes to finalize a checkpoint (Atropos) that includes the transactions; (c) sends another transaction to double-spends;
(d) gets caught and his stakes are burned as honest validators are incentivezed to report such misbehavior. In another
scenario, an attacker acquires (a) F/3 +  to attempt for an attack and suppose Blue validators own F/3 − /2, and
Red validators own the rest F/3− /2. The attacker can (b) vote for the transaction with Blue validators, and then(c)
vote for the conflicting transaction with the Red validations. Then both transactions will be finalized because they
have 2F/3 + /2 votes. Blue and Red validators may later see the finalized checkpoint, approve the transaction, but
only one of them will get paid eventually.
Sabotage (going offline) An attacker owning F/3 +  of the stakes can appear offline by not voting and hence check-
points and transactions cannot be finalized. Users are expected to coordinate outside of the network to censor the
malicious validators.
In StakeDag, the protocol relies on every honest validators to detect and report such attacks. The attack, once detected,
will cause a loss of tokens to the attacker. In fact, our StakeDag protocol guarantees a 1/3-BFT in which no more than
F/3 tokens are owned by misbehaving nodes. We have provided our proof of 1/3-BFT in previous section and also
more details are given in the Appendix.
Specially, let us consider the case an attacker in StakeDag network with F/3 + . In Double-Spending, s/he can
manage to achieve a root block rb with Blue validators and a conflict root block rr with Red validators. However, in
order for either of the two event blocks to be finalized (becoming Clotho and then Atropos), each of root blocks need
to be confirmed by two roots of next levels. Since peers always share their event blocks, an attacker cannot stop the
Blue and Red validators (honest) to share event blocks to each other. Therefore, there will exist an honest validator
from Blue or Red groups, who detects conflicting event blocks in the next level roots. Because honest validators are
incentivezed to find out and report such wrongdoing, the attacker will get caught and his stakes are burned. Similarly,
for Sabotage attack, the attacker may refuse to vote for a while. But honest validators will find out the absence of those
high stake validators after a number of computed layers.
Comparison of attack cost in PoS versus PoW It will cost more for an attack in PoS blockchain due to the scarity
of the native token than in a PoW blockchain. In order to gain more stake for an attack in PoS, it will cost a lot for
an outside attacker. S/he will need 2F/3 (or F/3 for certain attacks) tokens, where F is the total number of tokens,
regardless of the token price. Acquiring more tokens will definitely increase its price, leading to a massive cost.
29
A PREPRINT - JULY 9, 2019
Another challenge is that all the tokens of a detected attempt will be burned. In contrast, PoW has no mechanism nor
enforcement to prevent an attacker from reattempting another attack. An attacker may purchase or rent the hash power
again for his next attempts.
Like PoS, our StakeDag protocol employs the PoS mechanism to effectively prevent potential attacks. Attackers will
need to acquire 2F/3 tokens (or at least F/3 for certain attacks) to fully influence the validation process. Any attempt
that is detected by peers will void the attacker’s deposit.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we introduce a new set of protocols, namely StakeDag, for a scalable asynchronous distributed system
with practical BFT. We propose a new family of consensus protocols S that uses Proof of Stake to achieve more
scalable and robust consensus in a DAG. Further, we present a model of staking used for our StakeDag framework.
Weight models and staking choices have been described.
We then introduce a specific consensus protocol, called Sφ, to address a more reliable consensus compared to predece-
dent DAG-based approaches. The new consensus protocol Sφ uses the well-known concept of layering of DAG, like
in our Lφ[23], to achieve a deterministic consensus on the S-OPERA chain. By using Proof of Stake, Sφ can improve
the scalability, sustainability than previous DAG-based approaches.
We have included formal definitions and semantics for our general model of StakeDag. Our formal proof of pBFT for
our StakeDag protocol is given in the Appendix. Our work extends the formal foundation established in our previous
paper [22], which is the first that studies concurrent common knowledge sematics [24] in DAG-based protocols.
Formal proofs for our layering-based Sφ protocol is also presented.
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9 Appendix
This section gives further details about the StakeDag protocol. We present the formal semantics of Sφ using the
concurrent common knowledge that can be applied to a generic model of DAG-based PoS approaches, and then show
the proofs for consensus of the protocol.
9.1 Formal definitions
9.1.1 Node State
A node is a machine participating in theS protocol. Each node has a local state consisting of local histories, messages,
event blocks, and peer information. Let ni denote the node with the identifier of i. Let n denote the total number of
nodes.
[State] A (local) state of i is denoted by sij consisting of a sequence of event blocks sij=vi0, vi1, . . . , vij .
In a DAG-based protocol, each event block vij is valid only if the reference blocks exist before it. A local state s
i
j is
corresponding to a unique DAG. In StakeDag, we simply denote the j-th local state of a node i by the DAG gij . Let
Gi denote the current local DAG of a process i.
An action is a function from one local state to another local state. An action can be either: a send(m) action of a
message m, a receive(m) action, and an internal action. A message m is a triple 〈i, j, B〉 where the sender i, the
message recipient j, and the message body B. In StakeDag, B consists of the content of an event block v. Let M
denote the set of messages. Semantics-wise, there are two actions that can change a process’s local state: creating a
new event and receiving an event from another process.
[Event] An event is a tuple 〈s, α, s′〉 consisting of a state, an action, and a state.
Sometimes, the event can be represented by the end state s′. The j-th event in history hi of process i is 〈sij−1, α, sij〉,
denoted by vij .
[Local history] A local history hi of i is a sequence of local states starting with an initial state. A set Hi of possible
local histories for each process i.
A process’s state can be obtained from its initial state and the sequence of actions or events that have occurred up to
the current state. StakeDag protocol uses append-only semantics. The local history may be equivalently described as
either of the following: (1) hi = si0,α
i
1,α
i
2, α
i
3 . . . , (2) hi = s
i
0, v
i
1,v
i
2, v
i
3 . . . , (3) hi = s
i
0, s
i
1, s
i
2, s
i
3, . . . . In StakeDag,
a local history is equivalently expressed as: hi = gi0, g
i
1, g
i
2, g
i
3, . . . where g
i
j is the j-th local DAG (local state) of the
process i.
[Run] Each asynchronous run is a vector of local histories. Denoted by σ = 〈h1, h2, h3, ...hN 〉.
Let Σ denote the set of asynchronous runs. A global state of run σ is an n-vector of prefixes of local histories of σ,
one prefix per process. The happens-before relation can be used to define a consistent global state, often termed a
consistent cut, as follows.
9.1.2 Lamport timestamps and Ordering
Our StakeDag protocol relies on Lamport timestamps to define a topological ordering of event blocks. The “happened
before” relation, denoted by→, gives a partial ordering of event blocks in a distributed system. For a pair of vi and
vj , then vi→ vj if : (1) vi and vj are events of the same node pi, and vi comes before vj , (2) vi is the send(m) by one
process and vj is the receive(m) by another process (3) vi → vk and vk → vj for some vk.
[Happened-Im-Before] An event block vx is said Happened-Immediate-Before an event block vy if vx is a (self-) ref
of vy . Denoted by vx 7→ vy .
[Happened-before] An event block vx is said Happened-Before an event block vy if vx is a (self-) ancestor of vy .
Denoted by vx→ vy .
Happened-before relation is the transitive closure of happens-immediately-before. Two event blocks vx and vy are
said concurrent, denoted by vx ‖ vy , if neither of them happened before the other. Two distinct events v and v′ are
said to be concurrent if v 9 v′ and v′ 9 v. Given two vertices vx and vy both contained in two OPERA chains
(DAGs) G1 and G2 on two nodes. We have the following: (1) vx → vy in G1 if vx → vy in G2; (2) vx ‖ vy in G1 if
vx ‖ vy in G2.
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[Total ordering] Let ≺ denote an arbitrary total ordering of the nodes (processes) pi and pj . Total ordering is a
relation ⇒ satisfying the following: for any event vi in pi and any event vj in pj , vi ⇒ vj if and only if either (i)
Ci(vi) < Cj(vj) or (ii) Ci(vi)=Cj(vj) and pi ≺ pj .
This defines a total ordering relation. The Clock Condition implies that if vi → vj then vi ⇒ vj .
9.1.3 Consistent Cut
An asynchronous system consists of the following sets: a set P of process identifiers, a set C of channels, a set Hi
of possible local histories for each process i, a set A of asynchronous runs, a set M of all messages. Consistent cuts
represent the concept of scalar time in distributed computation, it is possible to distinguish between a “before” and an
“after”, see CCK paper [24].
Consistent cut model of StakeDag protocol is based on the model in our previous work [22, 23]. More details can be
found in our previous papers.
9.2 DAG and S-OPERA chain
Each node can create event blocks, send (receive) messages to (from) other nodes. Each event block has exactly k
references: a self-ref reference, and k-1 other-ref references pointing to the top events of k-1 peer nodes. Each node
stores the current local state in a form of a directed acyclic graph G=(V , E), where V is a set of vertices and E is a
set of edges.
[Event block] An event block is a holder of a set of transactions. An event block includes the signature, generation
time, transaction history, and references to previous event blocks.
[Top event] An event v is a top event of a node ni if there is no other event in ni referencing v.
[Ref] An event vr is called “ref” of event vc if the reference hash of vc points to the event vr. Denoted by vc ↪→r vr.
For simplicity, we can use ↪→ to denote a reference relationship (either ↪→r or ↪→s).
[Self-ref] An event vs is called “self-ref” of event vc, if the self-ref hash of vc points to the event vs. Denoted by
vc ↪→s vs.
An event block va is self-ancestor of an event block vc if there is a sequence of events such that vc ↪→s v1 ↪→s . . . ↪→s
vm ↪→s va. Denoted by vc ↪→sa va. An event block va is an ancestor of an event block vc if there is a sequence of
events such that vc ↪→ v1 ↪→ . . . ↪→ vm ↪→ va. Denoted by vc ↪→a va. For simplicity, we simply use vc ↪→a vs to
refer both ancestor and self-ancestor relationship, unless we need to distinguish the two cases.
S-OPERA chain: An S-OPERA chain is the local view of the DAG G=(V ,E). Each vertex vi ∈ V is an event block.
Each block has a weight, which is the validation score. An edge (vi,vj) ∈ E refers to a hashing reference from vi to
vj ; that is, vi ↪→ vj .
[S-OPERA chain] In StakeDag, a S-OPERA chain is weighted DAG stored on each node.
[Leaf] The first created event block of a node is called a leaf event block.
[Root] An event block v is a root if either (1) it is the leaf event block of a node, or (2) v can reach more than 2W/3
validating power from previous roots.
[Root set] The set of all first event blocks (leaf events) of all nodes form the first root set R1 (|R1| = n). The root set
Rk consists of all roots ri such that ri 6∈ Ri, ∀ i = 1..(k-1) and ri can reach more than 2W/3 validating power from
other roots in the current frame, i = 1..(k-1).
[Frame] Frame fi is a natural number that separates Root sets. The root set at frame fi is denoted by Ri.
[Creator] If a node ni creates an event block v, then the creator of v, denoted by cr(v), is ni.
[Clotho] A root rk in the frame fa+3 can nominate a root ra as Clotho if more than 2n/3 roots in the frame fa+1
dominate ra and rk dominates the roots in the frame fa+1.
[Atropos] An Atropos is a Clotho that is decided as final.
Event blocks in the subgraph rooted at the Atropos are also final events. Atropos blocks form a Main-chain, which
allows time consensus ordering and responses to attacks.
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9.3 Layering
For a directed acyclic graph G=(V ,E), a layering is to assign a layer number to each vertex in G.
[Layering] A layering (or levelling) of G is a topological numbering φ of G, φ : V → Z, mapping the set of vertices
V of G to integers such that φ(v) ≥ φ(u) + 1 for every directed edge (u, v) ∈ E.
[Hierarchical graph] For a layering φ, the produced graph H=(V ,E,φ) is a hierarchical graph.
H is also called an l-layered directed graph and could be represented as H=(V1,V2,. . . ,Vl;E). Let V +(v) denote
the outgoing neighbours of v; V +(v) ={u ∈ V |(v, u) ∈ E}. Let V −(v) denote the incoming neighbours of v;
V −(v)={u ∈ V |(u, v) ∈ E}. The height of H is l. The width of H is the number of vertices in the longest layer; that
is, max1≤i≤l|Vi|.
There are several approaches to DAG layering. The two most common ones are given as follows. Longest path layering
is a list scheduling algorithm produces hierarchical graph with the smallest possible height [41, 42]. For minimum
height, it places all source vertices in the first layer V1. The layer φ(v) for every remaining vertex v is recursively
defined by φ(v) = max{φ(u)|(u, v) ∈ E} + 1. By using a topological ordering of the vertices [43], the algorithm
can be implemented in linear time O(|V |+|E|). Coffman-Graham (CG) algorithm, which considers a layering with a
maximum width [44]. It is currently the most commonly used layering method. Lam and Sethi [45] showed that the
number of layers l of the computed layering with widthw is bounded by l ≤ (2−2/w).lopt, where lopt is the minimum
height of all layerings with width w. So, CG algorithm is an exact algorithm for w ≤ 2. In certain appplications, the
notion of width does not consider dummy vertices.
Online Layering in StakeDag: Algorithm 5 presents the Online layering algorithms. Online Longest Path Layering
(O-LPL) algorithm takes as input the following information: U is the set of processed vertices, Z is the set of already
layered vertices, l is the current height (maximum layer number), V ′ is the set of new vertices, and E′ is the set of new
edges. The algorithms has a worst case time complexity of O(|V ′|+ |E′|).
Algorithm 5 Online Layering Algorithms
1: Require:A DAG G=(V ,E) and G′=(V ′,E′)
2: function ONLINELPL(U , Z, l, V ′, E′)
3: Vnew ← V ∪ V ′, Enew ← E ∪ E′
4: while U 6= Vnew do
5: Select v ∈ Vnew \ U with V +new(v) ⊆ Z
6: if v has been selected then
7: l′ ← max{φ(u)|u ∈ V +new(v)} +1
8: φ(v)← l′
9: U ← U ∪ {v}
10: if no vertex has been selected then
11: l← l + 1
12: Z ← Z ∪ U
1: Require:A reduced DAG G = (V,E) and G′ = (V ′, E′)
2: function ONLINECOFFMANGRAHAM(W , U , l, φ, V ′, E′)
3: for all v ∈ V ′ do λ(v)←∞
4: for i← 1 to |V ′| do
5: Choose v ∈ V ′ with λ(v) =∞ s.t. |V −(v)| is min
6: λ(v)← 1
7: Vnew ← V ∪ V ′; Enew ← E ∪ E′
8: while U 6= Vnew do
9: Choose v ∈ Vnew \ U s.t. V +new(v) ⊆ U and λ(v) is max
10: l′ ← max{φ(u)|u ∈ V +new(v)} +1
11: if |φl′ | ≤W and V +new(v) ⊆ φ1 ∪ φ2 ∪ · · · ∪ φl′−1 then
12: φl′ ← φl′ ∪ {v}
13: else
14: l← l+1
15: φl ← {v}
16: U ← U ∪ {v}
Online Coffman-Graham (O-CG) Algorithm takes as input the following: W is the fixed maximum width, U is the
unprocessed vertices, l is the current height (maximum layer), φ is the layering assignment, V ′ is the set of new
vertices, E′ is the set of new edges. The algorithms has a worst case time complexity of O(|V ′|2). The algorithm
assumes that the given value of width W is sufficiently large. Section 5.7.2 gives some discussions about choosing an
appropriate value of W .
9.4 Semantics and Proofs of Consensus
Sφ protocol uses several novel concepts such as S-OPERA chain, H-OPERA chain, Root graph and Frame assignment
to achieve deterministic consensus in PoS DAG. We now present our formal model for the consistency of knowledge
across the distributed network of nodes. We use the consistent cut model, based on our ONLAY paper [23]. We
generalize the concurrent common knowledge in PoS DAG-based protocol, for details see the original CCK paper [24].
For an S-OPERA chain G, let G[v] denote the subgraph of G that contains nodes and edges reachable from v.
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[Consistent chains] Two chains G1 and G2 are consistent, denoted by G1 ∼ G2, if for any event v contained in both
chains, G1[v] = G2[v].
For any block v, a node must already have the k references of v in order to accept v. For any two nodes, suppose their
S-OPERA chains contain the same event v. Thus, both S-OPERA chains must contain k references of v. Presumably,
the cryptographic hashes are always secure and references must be identical between nodes. By induction, all
ancestors of v must be the same. Hence, the two consistent chains must contain the same set of ancestors for v, with
the same reference and self-ref edges between those ancestors. Consequently, the two OPERA chains are consistent.
[Global S-OPERA chain] A global consistent chain GC is a chain such that GC ∼ Gi for all Gi.
Let G v G′ denote that G is a subgraph of G′. Some properties of GC are given as follows: (1) ∀Gi (GC v Gi); (2)
∀v ∈ GC ∀Gi (GC [v] = Gi[v]); (3) (∀vc ∈ GC) (∀vp ∈ Gi) ((vp → vc)⇒ vp ∈ GC).
The layering of consistent S-OPERA chains is consistent itself.
[Consistent layering] For any two consistent OPERA chains G1 and G2, layering results φG1 and φG2 are consistent,
denoted by φG1 ∼ φG2 , if φG1(v) = φG2(v), for any vertex v common to both chains.
Theorem 9.1. For two consistent OPERA chainsG1 and G2, the resulting H-OPERA chains using layering φLPL are
consistent.
The theorem states that for any event v contained in both OPERA chains, φG1LPL(v) = φ
G2
LPL(v). Since G1 ∼ G2, we
have G1[v] = G2[v]. Thus, the height of v is the same in both G1 and G2. Thus, the assigned layer using φLPL is the
same for v in both chains.
Proposition 9.2 (Consistent root graphs). Two root graphs GR and G′R from two consistent H-OPERA chains are
consistent.
[Consistent root] Two chains G1 and G2 are root consistent, if for every v contained in both chains, v is a root of j-th
frame in G1, then v is a root of j-th frame in G2.
Proposition 9.3. For any two consistent OPERA chains G1 and G2, they are root consistent.
By consistent chains, if G1 ∼ G2 and v belongs to both chains, then G1[v] = G2[v]. We can prove the proposition
by induction. For j = 0, the first root set is the same in both G1 and G2. Hence, it holds for j = 0. Suppose that the
proposition holds for every j from 0 to k. We prove that it also holds for j= k + 1. Suppose that v is a root of frame
fk+1 in G1. Then there exists a set S reaching 2/3 of members in G1 of frame fk such that ∀u ∈ S (u → v). As
G1 ∼ G2, and v in G2, then ∀u ∈ S (u ∈ G2). Since the proposition holds for j=k, As u is a root of frame fk in G1,
u is a root of frame fk in G2. Hence, the set S of 2/3 members u happens before v in G2. So v belongs to fk+1 in G2.
Thus, all nodes have the same consistent root sets, which are the root sets in GC . Frame numbers are consistent for
all nodes.
[Flag table] A flag table stores reachability from an event block to the weighted roots.
Given two consisten S-OPERA chains G1 and G2 (G1 ∼ G2), we have the following
[Consistent Flag Table] For event block v in both G1 and G2, and G1 ∼ G2, then the flag tables of v are consistent if
they are the same in both chains.
From the above, the root sets of G1 and G2 are consistent. If v contained in G1, and v is a root of j-th frame in G1,
then v is a root of j-th frame in Gi. Since G1 ∼ G2, G1[v] = G2[v]. The reference event blocks of v are the same in
both chains. Thus the flag tables of v of both chains are the same.
[Consistent Validation Score] For event block v in both G1 and G2, and G1 ∼ G2, the validation score of v in G1 is
identical with that of v in G2.
Since the flag tables of v are the same on both chains, the roots are consistent. The weights of the roots are also
consistent across the nodes. The validation score of an event block v is the sum of the validating powers of the roots.
Thus, the validation score of v is also consistent across the nodes.
Proposition 9.4 (Consistent Clotho). A root rk in the frame fa+3 can nominate a root ra as Clotho if more than 2n/3
roots in the frame fa+1 dominate ra and rk dominates the roots in the frame fa+1.
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Proposition 9.5 (Consistent Atropos). An Atropos is a Clotho that is decided as final. Event blocks in the subgraph
rooted at the Atropos are also final events. Atropos blocks form a Main-chain, which allows time consensus ordering
and responses to attacks.
Proposition 9.6 (Consistent Main-chain). For any two honest nodes, the Main-chain is the same on both nodes.
[Main-chain] Main chain is a special sub-graph of the OPERA chain that stores Atropos vertices.
The Main chain stores the ordered list of finalized Atropos blocks. Since Clothos and Atropos blocks are consistent
on any two honest nodes, the Main chain is the same on both nodes. The Main chain can be used for fast track of
finalized blocks, transaction search and for detecting potential conflicting transactions.
For global state, StakeDag protocol use a similar algorithm like in our ONLAY paper [23]. From local view H-OPERA
chain, a node can estimate the subgraph of H that other nodes have known at the time. The intuition is that a node ni,
from its history H , conservatively knows that the other node nj may just know the event blocks under the top event of
nj . Let ti denote the top event of a node ni in the local chain H . From the local state H , a node can determine all top
events of all nodes in H .
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